Why would the work of the 17th century philosopher Benedict de Spinoza concern us today? How can Spinoza shed any light on contemporary thought? In this intriguing book, Moira Gatens and Genevieve Lloyd show us that in spite of or rather because of Spinoza's apparent strangeness, his philosophy can be a rich resource for cultural self-understanding in the present. _Collective Imaginings_ draws on recent re-assessments of the philosophy of Spinoza to develop new ways of conceptualising issues of freedom and (...) difference. This ground-breaking study will be invaluable reading to anyone wishing to gain a fresh perspective on Spinoza's thought. (shrink)

I propose an account truthmaking that provides truthmakers for negative truths. The account replaces Truthmaker Necessitarianism with a "Duplication Principle", according to which a suitable entity T is a truthmaker for a proposition P just in case the existence of an appropriate counterpart of T entails the truth of P, where the counterpart relation is cashed out in terms of qualitative duplication. My account captures an intuitive notion of truthmakers as "things the way they are", validates two appealing principles about (...) entailment and containment proposed by David Armstrong, and invalidates the controversial Disjunction Thesis. (shrink)

One of the standard approaches to the metaphysics of personal identity has some counter-intuitive ethical consequences when combined with maximising consequentialism and a plausible doctrine about aggregation of consequences. This metaphysical doctrine is the so-called ‘multiple occupancy’ approach to puzzles about fission and fusion. It gives rise to a new version of the ‘utility monster’ problem, particularly difficult problems about infinite utility, and a new version of a Parfit-style ‘repugnant conclusion’. While the article focuses on maximising consequentialism for simplicity, the (...) problems demonstrated apply more widely to a range of ethical views, especially flavours of consequentialism. This article demonstrates how these problems arise, and discusses a number of options available in the light of these problems for a consequentialist tempted by a multiple occupancy metaphysics. (shrink)

Tracking accounts of knowledge formulated in terms of counterfactuals suffer from well known problems. Examples are provided, and it is shown that moving to a dispositional tracking theory of knowledge avoids three of these problems.

Philosophers often talk about the things we say, or believe, or think, or mean. The things are often called ‘propositions’. A proposition is what one believes, or thinks, or means when one believes, thinks, or means something. Talk about propositions is ubiquitous when philosophers turn their gaze to language, meaning and thought. But what are propositions? Is there a single class of things that serve as the objects of belief, the bearers of truth, and the meanings of utterances? How do (...) our utterances express propositions? Under what conditions do two speakers say the same thing, and what (if anything) does this tell us about the nature of propositions? There is no consensus on these questions—or even on whether propositions should be treated as things at all. During the second Propositions and Same-Saying workshop, which took place on July 19–21 2010 at the University of Sydney, philosophers debated these (and related) questions. The workshop covered topics in the philosophy of language, perception, and metaphysics. The present volume contains revised and expanded versions of the papers presented at the workshop. (shrink)

One of the standard approaches to the metaphysics of personal identity has some counter‐intuitive ethical consequences when combined with maximising consequentialism and a plausible (though not uncontroversial) doctrine about aggregation of consequences. This metaphysical doctrine is the so‐called ‘multiple occupancy’ approach to puzzles about fission and fusion. It gives rise to a new version of the ‘utility monster’ problem, particularly difficult problems about infinite utility, and a new version of a Parfit‐style ‘repugnant conclusion’. While the article focuses on maximising consequentialism (...) for simplicity, the problems demonstrated apply more widely to a range of ethical views, especially flavours of consequentialism. This article demonstrates how these problems arise, and discusses a number of options available in the light of these problems for a consequentialist tempted by a multiple occupancy metaphysics. (shrink)

The paper explores an apparent tension in Spinoza's thought between his treatment of man as part of nature, with no specially privileged position within it; and his treatment of morality as circumscribed by what is good for human beings. These two themes, it is argued, are in fact interconnected in Spinoza's thought. The paper goes on to consider some possible responses, from a contemporary standpoint, to Spinoza's rejection of animal rights. Finally, it is argued that the apparent tension in Spinoza's (...) thought becomes more understandable in the light of his treatment of the importance of truth to human beings; and that this throws into relief some puzzling features of some contemporary formulations of the theme of man as part of nature. (shrink)

David Lewis claimed that deterministic chance was impossible. But deterministic chance seems ubiquitous in casinos, in statistical mechanics, and in evolutionary theory. It would be best for Lewis's metaphysics if, in spite of what he says, we could reconcile his core views with deterministic chance. In this chapter, the author briefly rebuts two Lewisian objections to deterministic chance. The first is that our world is indeterministic at the quantum level, and this lower‐level indeterminism translates to indeterminism at higher levels. The (...) chapter explains how deterministic chances are possible on a broadly Lewisian theory. It also explains how there can be deterministic chances that function as nomological magnitudes, guide credence, and arise in objectively chancy situations. It is true that the author's deterministic chances are not time‐indexed. It is also true that they do not exactly satisfy principles, proposed by Lewis and others in a broadly Lewisian tradition, that presuppose time‐indexing. (shrink)

A careful reproduction of the 1931 Princeton University Press edition, including seven fine-screened black-and-white photographs on heavy coated paper of archival quality to preserve the finest detail. The Wright designed cover is treated with a protective coating to ensure that Wright’s subtle colors are protected from damage by abrasion or deterioration from extended exposure to sunlight. This book is one of the earliest statements by Wright of the principles of design that were to guide his entire career. Wright described this (...) book in a 1931 letter as “my Garden.” In these lectures are found not forms but fire, not formulas but ideas, not formality but vitality. They are not merely a monument to Wright’s work up to that time, but ideas that continue to bear fruit today. As E. Baldwin Smith writes in his preface, “[The lectures] are the sermons of an engaging, self-confident and enthusiastic artist fired with a faith, not in the machine itself, but in the power of man to master his creation, the machine, and to make it fashion a new manifestation of beauty.” He went on to prophesy that as Wright sought to “give men a new and hopeful outlook on the Machine, his philosophy of life, with his reactions, ideas and prejudices, will become a document in the history of art.” This fine new edition admirably fulfills that vision. (shrink)

Although environmental ethics has become more familiar and comfortable with the work of postmodernism, “deconstruction” in particular continues to be depicted as “destructive” and “nihilistic.” A close examination of some specific works of deconstruction, however, shows that, far from denying responsibilities to the environment, deconstruction seeks to affirm a radical obligation toward the “other.” Because this possibility is habitually ruled out by denunciations of deconstruction’s imputed relativism, I begin with a dramatized account of the possible reception of deconstruction within environmental (...) ethics in order to stage the ethical implications of modes of criticism. I then discuss specific parallels between the work of deconstruction and that of environmental ethics, and suggest that a deconstructive spirit is at the heart of environmental philosophy’s recent—and most important—work on the question of “universal consideration.”. (shrink)

Geoffrey Lloyd engages in a wide-ranging exploration of what we can learn from the study of ancient civilisations that is relevant to fundamental problems, both intellectual and moral, that we still face today. How far is it possible to arrive at an understanding of alien systems of belief? Is it possible to talk meaningfully of 'science' and of its various constituent disciplines, 'astronomy', 'geography', 'anatomy', and so on, in the ancient world? Are logic and its laws universal? Is there (...) one ontology - a single world - to which all attempts at understanding must be considered to be directed? When we encounter apparently very different views of reality, how far can that be put down to a difference in conceptions of what needs explaining, or of what counts as an explanation, or to different preferred modes of reasoning or styles of inquiry? Do the notions of truth and belief represent reliable cross-cultural universals? In another area, what can ancient history teach us about today's social and political problems? Are the discourses of human nature and of human rights universally applicable? What political institutions do we need to help secure equity and justice within nation states and between them? Lloyd sets out to answer all these questions, and to convince us that the science and culture of ancient Greece and China provide precious resources to advance modern debates. (shrink)

What happens when a debtor does not pay back what he or she owes? As Margaret Atwood's chapter on “The Shadow Side” shows, the unpaid debt—in the broadest sense—is a recurring theme of history and literature. This review essay looks at the fourteenth-century village, a world which, perhaps contrary to expectations, turns out to have been characterized by a large number of outstanding interpersonal debts of money and goods. We know about these debts because the creditors were obliged to use (...) local courts in order to recover them. Remarks are offered on the circumstances that led to so many individuals being sued for debt, in particular English villages in this period. Discussion then focuses on the extent to which the proliferation of unpaid debts between villagers led to tensions or a breakdown in trust within rural society. The essay concludes with comments on the character and functions of institutions and rules that have developed in this and other societies to deal with the “won't pay” tendencies of human beings. (shrink)

Selfhood requires sufficient rationality, the capacities for self-reflection and self-knowledge, the capacity for autonomous action, temporal situatedness and an awareness of this, and psychological continuity and an awareness of this. Contemporary philosophers have more or less reached a consensus regarding NS, and the lion's share of discourse regarding the self seems to center on making sense of this constellation.While certainly having their own respective places within such discussions, value and commitment too often take a back seat. Here, I return attention (...) to these aspects of the self, specifically, in revisiting one of the more... (shrink)

I provide critical discussion of conception of and talk of psychic integration which I take to be both excessive and deficient; these viciously extreme positions are championed by the Apostle Paul and St. Augustine, and by Jacques Lacan and María Lugones, respectively. I suggest that we must negotiate a Buddhist-inspired understanding located between these extremes in endorsing any acceptable conception of the self, generally speaking—a conception which, contra the strong antirealist about selves, allows for the continued use of selfhood in (...) everyday discourse, but which, contra the strong realist about selves, does not fall into an unhealthy idealization of anything approximating perfect psychic wholeness. (shrink)

Few have done more than Martin Gutzwiller to clarify the connection between classical time-dependent motion and the time-independent states of quantum systems. Hence it seems appropriate to include the following discussion of the origins of the time-dependent Schrödinger equation in this volume dedicated to him.

In common usage, ‘hermeneutics’ is a word often used interchangeably with ‘interpretation’. This has especially become so in biblical studies, but a review of how the word ‘hermeneutics’ came to prominence in biblical scholarship suggests that there is value in continuing to keep it as a concept distinguishable from interpretation. The omnipresence of the word in contemporary biblical studies obscures some of the specific roles that hermeneutics is well suited to perform. The potential benefits of hermeneutics in this more limited (...) sense for biblical interpretation are discussed with respect to the two main hermeneutical theorists of the late twentieth century: Hans‐Georg Gadamer and Paul Ricoeur. (shrink)